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ESSAYS

HOW CRIMINAL LAW CAN HELP SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT
BY
RENA STEINZOR*

The nation is experiencing a white collar crime boomlet, if not a
wave, of offenses that harm public health, jeopardize worker and
consumer safety, and threaten the environment. Some big cases have
settled and others are being tried. Still others are under investigation,
including the notorious Volkswagen (VW) “defeat device” case that
continues to make news almost every day. Stung by criticism that toobig-to-fail banks escaped criminal prosecution for the 2008 market
crash that continues to cause misery in the country, the Department of
Justice has pledged to indict individual corporate executives whenever
possible. It has yet to deliver on that promise, but unless Republicans
retake the White House and carry through on pledges to further
dismantle the regulatory state, every account of high-profile corporate
malfeasance will speculate about criminal implications.
These developments do not represent an idiosyncratic emergence
of a handful of rogue corporations and executives even as their
competitors studiously avoid running afoul of the law. Instead, a
relentless campaign against big government has produced weak to
nonexistent enforcement as well as widespread corporate disdain for
regulatory requirements. Without any question, criminal law is the last
resort. It closes the barn door after the horses have run free, leaving the
aftermath of an incident to be ameliorated at great cost, often over
periods of several years. Environmental laws were enacted because of
similar flaws in the tort system with the goal of preventing injury rather
* Rena Steinzor is a professor at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law and the author
of the book Why Not Jail: Industrial Catastrophes, Corporate Malfeasance, and Government
Inaction published by Cambridge University Press in 2014. She thanks Diana Griffin for
research assistance and Susan McCarty for editorial assistance.
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than merely compensating it. Good regulation enforced aggressively to
prevent harm is always a better choice. But congressional
conservatives and their industry allies have embarked on a highly
successful strategy of starving and badgering the agencies—even the
Environmental Protection Agency, the strongest and most rebellious
among them—into quiescence. In the vacuum that remains, criminal
prosecutions, especially of individual senior executives, have a better
potential to deter violations than the broken regulatory system.
This Essay explores, contrasts, and compares the two most
prominent criminal cases that have emerged in the last several years:
the $4 billion criminal settlement with British Petroleum that resulted
from the Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill and the VW cheat
device scandal. The similarities between the two cases are chilling.
They suggest that until and unless the regulatory state is not just
revived but greatly strengthened, a result that does not seem
foreseeable in the near-term, criminal prosecution is the best hope for
people who believe that the government must redouble its efforts to
preserve natural resources and protect the public health.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The nation is experiencing a white collar crime boomlet, if not a wave,
of offenses that harm public health, jeopardize worker and consumer safety,
and threaten the environment. Prosecutors have indicted corporate and
individual defendants. Some big cases have settled and others are being
tried. Still others are under investigation, including the notorious
Volkswagen (VW) “defeat device” case that made front-page news just a few
days before this talk.1 If 2007 was the “year of the recall,”2 2014 and 2015
were the “years of the indictment,” with no end in sight.
1 Coral Davenport & Jack Ewing, VW Is Said to Cheat on Diesel Emissions: U.S. to Order
Big Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/business/volkswagen-

is-ordered-to-recall-nearly-500000-vehicles-over-emissions-software.html (last visited Feb. 13,
2016).
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In the environmental arena, prosecutors have targeted the Deepwater
Horizon explosion and spill in the Gulf of Mexico (eleven men died and 4.09
million barrels of crude oil spilled into fragile Gulf ecosystems over an
agonizing period of eighty-seven days);3 the chemical leak that contaminated
the drinking water of Charleston, West Virginia (the chemical, 4methylcyclohexanemethanol, had never been tested for toxicological effects,
and though federal and state experts indicated that the water was safe to
drink, many abstained because it carried a chemical smell);4 and the VW air
emissions control cheat device scandal (the company installed software in
eleven million diesel cars sold in the United States and Europe that disabled
pollution controls during normal driving, causing emissions to exceed safe
levels by as much as forty percent, depending on driving conditions and
other factors).5
In the consumer and worker safety arenas, criminal cases have targeted
the New England Compounding Center’s shipment of thousands of
supposedly sterile steroid injects that were in fact contaminated with fungal
meningitis (sixty-four people died and 751 were severely sickened);6 the
Upper Big Branch mine collapse (twenty-nine men killed in the worst mine
disaster in forty years);7 the sale of salmonella-tainted peanut butter (nine
2 Gene Grabowski, The Year of the Recall Response, FOOD SAFETY MAG., Feb.–Mar. 2008,
http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/magazine-archive1/februarymarch-2008/the-year-of-therecall-response/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Louise Story & David Barboza, Mattel Recalls 19
Million Toys Sent from China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/08/15/business/worldbusiness/15imports.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
3 Clifford Krauss, In BP Indictments, U.S. Shifts to Hold Individuals Accountable, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/energy-environment/in-bpindictments-us-shifts-to-hold-individuals-accountable.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). For the
size and scope of the spill, see Bill Trott, U.S. Appeals Ruling on Size of BP Oil Spill, REUTERS,
Mar. 14, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/14/us-bp-trial-appeal-idUSKBN0MA0QB
20150314#yqGdHgOYzUL5mA30.97 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (BP and the U.S. government
disagree about the size of the spill; 4.09 million barrels is the government figure); see also John
M. Broder, BP Shortcuts Led to Gulf Oil Spill, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/science/earth/15spill.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016)
(discussing the 87 days that passed before the spill was under control).
4 Michael Wines, Owners of Chemical Firm Charged in Elk River Spill in West Virginia,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/us/owners-of-chemical-companycharged-in-elk-river-spill.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); U.S. Geological Survey, Chemicals in
Elk River Spill Lingered Longer, Traveled Farther: USGS Study Provides New Insights,
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=4095&from=rss (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
5 Davenport & Ewing, supra note 1; Andreas Cremer, Volkswagen to Refit Cars Affected by
Emissions Scandal, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/30/usvolkswagen-emissions-plan-idUSKCN0RT0OL20150930#eQjeo9bWh36AcMQ2.97 (last visited
Feb. 13, 2016).
6 Kay Lazar & Todd Wallack, 14 Executives, Staff Charged in Tainted Drug Case, BOS.
GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/17/feds-arrest-tied-neccclosed-pharmacy-blamed-causing-deaths-with-tainted-drugs/24QytISVdaqXDNsSUOsNYJ/
story.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 14 Indicted in Connection with New
England Compounding Center and Nationwide Fungal Meningitis Outbreak, Dec. 17, 2014,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/14-indicted-connection-new-england-compounding-center-andnationwide-fungal-meningitis (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
7 Ken Ward Jr., Longtime Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship Indicted, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL, Nov. 13, 2014, http://www.wvgazettemail.com/article/20141113/GZ01/141119629
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dead)8 and eggs (at least 1,900 and potentially as many as 56,000 sickened),9
and listeria-tainted cantaloupe (thirty-three dead);10 and fatal defects in
millions of cars sold by Toyota11 and General Motors (the company paid
claims to the families of 124 people, but that number is likely to at least
double);12 as well as the as-yet unknown number of vehicles that may contain
exploding Takata airbags (so far, more than an astounding thirty million cars
have been recalled for that defect alone).13
Altogether, these cases involve hundreds of deaths, thousands of
injuries, and billions of dollars in damage to the environment, consumers,
workers, and, not incidentally, the companies involved. The VW scandal, for
example, has provoked the company to write off $7.5 billion in anticipation
of what it will cost to solve the problem.14
Is the emergence of criminal investigations and indictments an anomaly
that happened to coalesce without a unifying cause and will vanish just as
suddenly? My analysis suggests not. These developments are not an
idiosyncratic emergence of rogue corporations and executives who have
done their damage while their competitors studiously avoid running afoul of
the law. Instinctively understanding the inattention to the law occurring at
some of the biggest companies in the most hazardous industries, the
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Peter Galuszka, Safety Last: One of the Most Reprehensible Bosses
in Recent History is Finally Facing Justice, SLATE, Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/09/don_blankenship_trial_boss_of_massey_duri
ng_upper_big_branch_explosion_ignored.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
8 Dan Flynn, Federal Judge to Sentence Parnell Brothers and Wilkerson on Sept. 21, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS, July 20, 2015, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/07/pca-case-judge-tosentence-parnell-brothers-and-wilkerson-on-sept-21/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (discussing the
nine deaths that resulted from salmonella-tainted peanut butter).
9 Associated Press, Ex-Egg Industry Executives Jailed in Salmonella Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/business/ex-egg-industry-executives-jailed-insalmonella-outbreak.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Colin Woodard, Notorious Egg Seller
“Jack” DeCoster Gets Jail Time for Salmonella Outbreak, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 13,
2015,
http://www.pressherald.com/2015/04/13/maine-businessman-jack-decoster-gets-jail-forselling-tainted-eggs/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
10 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Colo., Eric and Ryan Jensen Charged with Introducing
Tainted Cantaloupe into Interstate Commerce, Sept. 26, 2013, http://www.justice.gov/usaoco/pr/eric-and-ryan-jensen-charged-introducing-tainted-cantaloupe-interstate-commerce
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2016); Mary Beth Marklein, Cantaloupe Farmers Get No Prison Time in Disease
Outbreak, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/28/
sentencing-of-colorado-cantaloupe-farmers/4958671/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
11 Bill Vlasic & Matt Apuzzo, Toyota Is Fined $1.2 Billion for Concealing Safety Defects,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/business/toyota-reaches-1-2billion-settlement-in-criminal-inquiry.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
12 Tom Krisher, GM Ignition Switch Fund Rejected 91% of Claims, USA TODAY, Aug. 24,
2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/08/24/gm-ignition-switch-fund/32282521/
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting that the company still “faces 181 wrongful death or injury
lawsuits due to recalled vehicles in the U.S. and Canada”).
13 Everything You Need to Know About the Takata Airbag Recall: What This Recall Means
to You and What Actions You Should Take, CONSUMER REP., Nov. 3, 2015, http://www.

consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/10/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-takata-air-bagrecall/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
14 This Company Just Wrote Off More than Volkswagen, FORTUNE, Oct. 29, 2015,
http://fortune.com/2015/10/29/shell-write-off-charge-loss-earnings/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
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Department of Justice (DOJ) now triggers criminal investigations almost
immediately after a health, safety, or environmental fiasco hits the national
news.15 Its eagerness to consider criminal sanctions, which became crystal
clear as several of the largest car companies in the world admitted to lifethreatening problem after problem, is unprecedented historically.16
Reliable figures are not available to compare the incidence of whitecollar criminal prosecutions in the health, safety, and environmental areas
over the last several decades. Anecdotally, apart from a fifteen-year period
beginning in the late 1980s and lasting into the early 2000s when
environmental crimes were prosecuted, compliance counseling, civil
remedies, and neglect prevailed at the agencies and within DOJ.17 Something
fundamental has changed and my diagnosis of what has caused these
seismic developments suggests we will see many more of these cases.
As I have written elsewhere, the primary cause of incidents that are
increasingly identified as crimes is acute regulatory failure that produces
weak to nonexistent enforcement as well as widespread corporate disdain
for regulatory requirements.18 Four converging realities have produced this
sad state of affairs.19 Budget cuts have hollowed out crucial agency
functions.20 Constant and opportunistic congressional attacks on agency
heads have demoralized rank and file civil servants to the point that many
have developed a kind of muscle memory for abuse that chills aggressive
implementation of the law.21 Outmoded statutory authority further
undermines effective enforcement and, although the statutes badly need
updating, Congress is unlikely to undertake that important, but contentious
and exhausting, task any time soon.22 Agencies struggle with a rulemaking
process so congealed that emerging problems remain unaddressed and
solutions to existing problems remain frozen in time. (We used to call
rulemaking “ossified,”23 but a stronger term like congealed is obviously
15 For example, there was a very short gap between the VW admission about defeat devices
and the announcement of criminal probes. See Davenport & Ewing, supra note 1 (noting that
the DOJ and EPA began jointly investigating VW shortly after discovery of the defeat devices).
16 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law,
http://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historical-development-environmental-criminal-law
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (explaining that “[i]t took several years for agencies to implement the
regulatory programs envisioned under the law,” so “there was little to enforce”).
17 Id. (noting that DOJ expanded its work starting in 1987).
18 Rena Steinzor, (Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”: Why Not Jail for Auto Executives?, 9 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 445–46 (2015).
19 RENA STEINZOR, WHY NOT JAIL? INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES, CORPORATE MALFEASANCE, AND
GOVERNMENT INACTION 19 (2015) [hereinafter WHY NOT JAIL?].
20 Id. at 19–21.
21 Id. at 19, 37–38.
22 Steinzor, (Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”, supra note 18, at 445–46. In fairness, having lived
through the reauthorization of Superfund in 1986 as a House counsel integrally involved in the
bruising battles that went on for three years to produce a final law, I can attest that
congressional reluctance to undertake such projects in these polarized times is understandable,
albeit irresponsible. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
23 For excellent analyses of how the rulemaking process has evolved from ossified to
congealed, compare Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
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necessary). The direct result is a series of incidents that take lives and
destroy natural resources.
Without any question, criminal law is the last resort. Admittedly, it
closes the barn door after the horses have run free, never giving lives back
and leaving the aftermath of an incident to be ameliorated at great cost,
often over periods of several years. Environmental laws were enacted
because of similar flaws in the tort system, which is far better at
compensating injury than preventing it.24 Good regulation prosecuted
aggressively is always a better choice. But congressional conservatives and
their industry allies have embarked on a highly successful strategy of
starving and badgering the agencies—even the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the most favored and rebellious among them—into
quiescence. In the vacuum that remains, criminal prosecutions, especially of
individual senior executives, have a better potential to deter violations than
the broken regulatory system. A third goal of the criminal law—what the
legal historian Lawrence Friedman describes as the setting of “moral
boundaries” to show a society “where the line lies between good and
bad”25—is too often overlooked. Its application to renegade companies and
their well-compensated executives has become extraordinarily important to
the quality of life in the developed and developing worlds. In sum, until and
unless the regulatory state is not just revived but greatly strengthened, a
result that does not seem foreseeable in the near-term, criminal prosecution
is the best hope for people who believe that the government must redouble
its efforts to preserve natural resources and protect the public health.
This observation brings us to two of the biggest corporate scandals of
all time: the Macondo well blowout that wrecked the Deepwater oil rig and
VW cheat devices.26 Before delving into the regulatory failures that explain
those catastrophes and how the criminal law applies to what happened, a
brief history of criminal prosecutions for environmental violations will
indicate just how powerful a tool the law can be when used by smart and
creative prosecutors.

Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386–87 (1992) (discussing the ossification of informal rulemaking,
the adverse consequence of this phenomenon, and ways to avoid ossification through tools to
make informal rulemaking more useful), with Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as
Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1681–82 (2012)
(discussing the general characteristics of administrative law as a blood sport and the
implications of this for administrative law).
24 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United
States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 88 (2001) (observing that environmental law challenged limitations
of tort law that made recovery for environmental harms difficult).
25 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 10 (1993).
26 Clifford Krauss, In BP Indictments, U.S. Shifts to Hold Individuals Accountable, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at B1; Coral Davenport & Jack Ewing, U.S. Orders Major VW Recall Over
Emissions Test Trickery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2015, at B2.
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II. RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICERS
The last time environmental lawyers had a serious debate regarding
criminal prosecution’s core federal statutes was during the first half of the
1990s, when the efforts of a specialized group of DOJ prosecutors known as
the Environmental Crimes Section27 resulted in a sharp uptick in such cases.
In a nod to the widespread popularity of environmental protection, the
Section operated independently from the much larger Criminal Division,28
which meant that these attorneys had the opportunity to elevate the
substantive mission of the office above DOJ’s broader institutional concerns.
But when George H.W. Bush took over from Ronald Reagan, a controversy
erupted regarding allegations that he had suppressed meritorious criminal
cases.29 President Bush shared President Reagan’s sympathy for business
concerns at the same time that he sought to establish a legacy as an
environmental president by supporting historic amendments to the Clean Air
Act.30 Congressional Democrats seized on the allegations that criminal cases
were being fixed for the president’s business friends, and Congressman John
Dingell (D-MI), the powerful chairman of the House Energy & Commerce
Committee committed the full power of his oversight authority to
investigating the alleged malfeasance.31
The debate over the possibility that prosecutors could abuse their
discretion by reading environmental statutes overly broadly was taken up in
the academy by an unlikely protagonist. Richard Lazarus—a professor first
at Washington University School of Law, next at Georgetown Law Center,
and now at Harvard Law School—had served on the transition team that
examined allegations regarding the conduct of the Environmental Crimes
Section for President-Elect Bill Clinton.32 In 1995, he published a landmark
law review article suggesting that because environmental law was relatively
new and still being integrated with more traditional legal principles, criminal
prosecutions were prone to abuse.33 Lazarus was then and is now generally
perceived to be a liberal who believes in the goals of the statutes, so his
27 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Environmental Crimes Section, http://www.justice.gov/enrd/
environmental-crimes-section (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
28 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, http://
www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historical-development-environmental-criminal-law (last
visited Feb. 13, 2016) (“[T]he Environmental Crimes Section became a fully independent
Section within the Environmental and Natural Resources Division.”).
29 See, e.g., EPA’s Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
1–2 (1992) [hereinafter H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce] (discussing concerns over
suppression of EPA cases during the Reagan administration).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). See Presidential Statement on Signing the Bill Amending
the Clean Air Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1602 (Nov. 15, 1990).
31 See, e.g., H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra note 29 (memorandum from Rep.
John D. Dingell explaining the Subcommittee’s purpose of investigating alleged malfeasance).
32 Richard J. Lazarus, Curriculum Vitae (2014), available at http://www.law.harvard.
edu/faculty/rlazarus/docs/LAZARUS_CV_12_May_2014.pdf.
33 Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2428–40, 2478–
79 (1995).
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residence on the other side of the ideological spectrum attracted significant
attention.34
Lazarus took the position that the “responsible corporate officer” or
“RCO” doctrine (also referred to as the “responsible relation doctrine”)
enables prosecutors to presume that defendants should be on notice
regarding the details of the acts prohibited by law, when all they really know
is that certain activities are regulated without understanding the technical
specifics of the rules that apply. 35 He argued that because environmental law
is quite complex and is based on technical and scientific data that can be
difficult to digest, executives far removed from the scene where illegal acts
take place should not be subject to such an extreme assumption.36 The effort
of understanding environmental law, Lazarus argued, calls for examination
of a “multiplicity of obscure sources” that are not limited to law as it is
commonly understood by lawyers.37 DOJ should wait, potentially for
decades, until environmental law was integrated into more traditional and
better developed bodies of law before using the heavy weaponry of the
criminal law.38
Lazarus was right that the RCO doctrine establishes culpability for
corporate managers who do not directly participate in criminal activities or
omissions if those activities are in their area of control and they should have
known violations were possible.39 So, for example, in one of the two seminal
Supreme Court cases that established the doctrine, United States v.
Dotterweich,40 the government prosecuted the president and general
manager of Buffalo Pharmacal under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act,41 following the shipment of adulterated pharmaceuticals in interstate
commerce.42 Dotterweich was not accused of actually wrapping the
packages himself.43 Rather, the government’s theory was that he had failed to
prevent a very serious public welfare offense.44 The Supreme Court wrote:
The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of
people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond
self-protection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of the
legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government and not
merely as a collection of English words. . . . Such legislation dispenses with the

34 Edited Transcripts from the Panel Discussions Held in Phoenix, Arizona on November
3rd and 4th, 1995, The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and Judicial
Mandates, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 112 (1996).
35 Lazarus, supra note 33, at 2468–71, 2520.
36 Id. at 2428–30, 2520.
37 Id. at 2478.
38 Id. at 2415–20.
39 See Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1246 (2006).
40 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
41 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012).
42 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.
43 United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942).
44 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. See Aagaard, supra note 39, at 1248–50 (discussing the
responsible relation doctrine and how it developed in Dotterweich and other case law).
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conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation
45
to a public danger.

Thirty-two years later, the Court reiterated the RCO doctrine in United
States v. Park,46 a case affirming the criminal culpability of the president of a
large national food store chain who received a letter from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) informing him that one of the company’s warehouses
was infested with rodents.47 Defendant Park delegated the task of eliminating
the contamination to an underling who neglected to get it done.48 The Court
explained the RCO doctrine:
Thus Dotterweich and the cases which have followed reveal that in providing
sanctions which read and touch the individuals who execute the corporate
mission—and this is by no means necessarily confined to a single corporate
agent or employee—the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement
measures that will insure that violations will not occur. The requirements of
foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond
question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than
the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of
authority in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health
49
and well-being of the public that supports them.

Because they are seminal cases and the Court was less inclined to write
mini-treatises on its views when they were decided, Dotterweich and Park
were ambiguous on one crucial point: whether the Court was trying to make
it easier for prosecutors to prove that a corporate officer or manager
harbored a “guilty mind” (mens rea) when an offense was committed or,
alternatively, whether the justices were accepting the application of criminal
liability to a class of people who had the authority and power to prevent
dangerous mistakes that would harm the public. From Professor Lazarus’s
perspective, however, both possibilities could easily lead to abuse of
prosecutorial discretion through the indictment of innocent people who did
not realize that they had done something wrong as defined by impenetrable
regulations.50
Lois Schiffer—then Assistant Attorney General for the Environment
and Natural Resources Division within which the Environmental Crimes
Section was located and a close colleague of Lazarus—reacted quickly and
with strong disagreement to his predictions of abuse, arguing that “(1) the
problems that he identifies are more theoretical than real; and (2) the

45

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280–81.

46

421 U.S. 658 (1975).

47

Id. at 67778.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 672.
Lazarus, supra note 33, at 2487.

48
49
50
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proposed changes—the consequences of which are largely unconsidered in
the article—would seriously undermine legitimate law enforcement.”51 At the
end of the day, as I hope to show in a moment, Schiffer was proven right
because DOJ’s inherent conservatism drove it to reject the criminal
prosecution alternative in all but the most egregious cases.
Unfortunately, the academic literature that followed Lazarus is a mishmash of confusing interpretations. Several scholars pursued the argument
that Dotterweich, Park, and their progeny affect the prosecutor’s burden of
proving mens rea at the time of the crime.52 They contended that the cases
make it too easy to climb the corporate chain and indict senior officials who,
in large corporations, cannot possibly be expected to understand the
convoluted nuances of health, safety, and environmental offenses.53 They
claimed that simply by occupying a position of responsibility within a large
and complex company, executives who are little more than innocent
bystanders could be held criminally culpable for activities that occur far
outside the reasonable scope of their knowledge.54
This alarmist approach is as theoretically flawed as it is factually
baseless. The RCO doctrine is more correctly viewed as a statement about
what category of individual defendant is appropriately targeted by the
criminal law, assuming that the mens rea and actus rea elements of such
offenses can be independently proven. As Professor Todd Aagaard has
explained quite eloquently, the doctrine does not supplant proof of mens rea
but instead imposes a responsibility on senior executives to prevent serious
violations.55 This interpretation is confirmed by the explicit language of the
Clean Air Act, which states in a definitional section: “For the purpose of this
subsection, the term ‘person’ includes, in addition to the entities referred to
in section 7602(e) of this title [containing definitions], any responsible
corporate officer.”56
The criticism that the RCO doctrine undermines fundamental fairness
by allowing prosecutors to convict on the basis of executive status and not
actual guilt also overlooks the fact that mens rea is judged by a reasonable
person standard.57 Or, in other words, prosecutors need not secure a
confession that a person knew what they were doing was wrong, but rather
may show, by circumstantial evidence if necessary, that any reasonable
person would realize that the result of the behavior, including reckless
indifference to likely consequences, would produce a violent result.58 This

51 Lois J. Schiffer & James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting Environmental Criminals:
A Response to Professor Lazarus, 83 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2531 (1995).
52 See, e.g., Lisa Ann Harig, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Responsible Corporate Officers
Convicted of Environmental Crimes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 DUKE L.J. 145,
147 (1992); Ruth Ann Weidel et al., The Erosion of Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 1100, 1105 (1991).
53 Harig, supra note 52, at 150–51.
54 Id.
55 Aagard, supra note 39, at 1253.
56
57

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (2012).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985).

58

Id.
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critical distinction makes it possible for prosecutors to bring criminal
charges based on willful blindness or recklessness, both long-standing
varieties of mens rea and of extraordinary importance to the prosecution of
senior corporate managers in appropriate circumstances.59
Fast forward twenty years, and we discover that the debate over the
propriety of criminal prosecutions has been overtaken by events. DOJ
brought appropriate prosecutions against deserving targets and rarely
overreached. When it did, trial and appellate courts stood ready to overturn
convictions, as they have done throughout the nation’s history, especially
with respect to emerging challenges for the criminal law (e.g., securities
manipulation, terrorism, and cybercrime).
Meanwhile, back at the source of the inspections that verify corporate
compliance or furnish the foundation for civil and criminal enforcement, all
was not well. The core agencies charged with responsibility to protect public
health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment were buffeted by
budget cuts, as well as two waves of very serious efforts to impose
regulatory reforms that swamped them in waves of new analyses and critical
White House oversight of their every controversial move.60 As the Tea Party
and other conservative candidates were elected in large numbers to
Congress, the first six years of the Obama Administration turned into a
retreat on many fronts. EPA’s personnel levels are at their lowest level since
1989, which was before enactment of the most ambitious piece of
environmental law ever—the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.61 The agency
plans a forty to fifty percent reduction in inspections and enforcement cases
over the next five years as a result.62 Climate change legislation failed in
Congress.63 EPA’s efforts to cut back on ozone, or smog, in the inner city
were pulled and shelved in advance of the 2010 election.64 The agency’s
59 For a discussion of these issues, see Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate
Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191 (1990).
60 For a thorough discussion of this history and the issues, see generally Rena Steinzor, The
Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L.

209 (2012), and RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS TO HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2010).
61 Ronald White, Congress Slashes EPA Budget Again Despite Strong Public Support for
Strengthening Health Protections, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, Jan. 12, 2014, http://
www.foreffectivegov.org/blog/congress-slashes-epa-budget-again-despite-strong-public-supportstrengthening-health-protection (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
62 White, supra note 61.
63 Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns: How the Senate and the White House Missed Their Best
Chance to Deal with Climate Change, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2010/10/11/as-the-world-burns (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
64 Juliet Eilperin, Obama Pulls Back Proposed Smog Standards in Victory for Business,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obamapulls-back-proposed-smog-standards-in-victory-for-business/2011/09/02/gIQAisTiwJ_story.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016). The standard was reproposed in 2015 but will take many years to
implement, not least because it has been challenged in court. Coral Davenport, New Limit for
Smog-Causing Emissions Isn’t as Strict as Many Had Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/politics/epa-to-unveil-new-limit-for-smog-causing-ozone-
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efforts to clarify its jurisdiction over wetlands and other bodies of water that
sometimes are dry were thrown into a maze of litigation.65 I could go on and
on. In this fraught space, the kinds of industrial disasters that inspired the
enactment of the major statutes in the first place reemerged, and the
criminal law progressed from an alternative implemented only on occasion
to a mainstay of the enforcement that is so crucial to achieving the
deterrence of reckless conduct—and therefore the prevention of harm—that
the laws were intended to deliver.
I offer two examples of such prosecutions to demonstrate not just the
importance of the criminal law in restoring momentum on protecting the
environment but also why the RCO doctrine is so important now and in the
future.
III. BRITISH PETROLEUM AND THE OIL INDUSTRY
The Deepwater Horizon blowout reminds us that although the United
States has exported a large portion of its manufacturing footprint to
southeast Asia, we are still engaged in high-hazard enterprises that threaten
workers, public health, and the environment every day.66 Perhaps the
greatest danger posed by such activities is the simultaneous downward
trajectory of the government’s oversight capacity and the oil and gas
industry’s tolerance of escalating levels of risk.

A. Dollar Wise and Risk Tolerant
On the roster of companies responsible for the worst fiascos since the
advent of industrialization, British Petroleum (BP) overachieves. The
blowout of the Macondo well and the resulting collapse of the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig killed eleven and deposited 4.1 million barrels of crude oil
into the Gulf of Mexico over the course of eighty-seven days.67 The rig was
owned by Transocean and leased by BP and they shared responsibility for

emissions.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Devin Henry, Coal Company Sues over “Destructive”
EPA Ozone Standards, HILL, Oct. 26, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/258129coal-company-sues-over-epa-ozone-standards (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
65 Coral Davenport, Obama Announces New Rule Limiting Water Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/us/obama-epa-clean-water-pollution.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2016); Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water Rule in Court, HILL,
June 30, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246539-27-states-challenge-obamawater-rule-in-court (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
66 The best resources for learning about the history of BP’s operations in America and the
Deepwater Horizon disaster are a documentary by the PBS program Frontline entitled The Spill,
and a book by a ProPublica reporter who worked with Frontline reporters on that film. See
Frontline & ProPublica, The Spill (PBS television broadcast Oct. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-spill/; ABRAHM LUSTGARTEN, RUN TO FAILURE: BP
AND THE MAKING OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER (2012).
67 LUSTGARTEN, supra note 66, at 331–32 (noting estimates of 200 million gallons of crude
released, which rounds to approximately 4.8 million barrels).
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the disaster.68 But to the extent that any single company dominated the bad
decisions that led to the disaster, BP was clearly in the lead.
Remarkably, the Deepwater Horizon disaster was not the first fatal and
environmentally destructive incident that cast BP as the villain and was
featured in the national media. In 2005, another explosion at the company’s
Texas City refinery killed fifteen and injured 180.69 That same month, BP’s $5
billion Gulf Coast production platform known as “Thunder Horse” tipped at
a sharp angle toward the sea because a valve was installed backwards.70 In
March 2006, a pipeline spill deposited over 200,000 gallons of oil on Alaska’s
North Slope.71 Regulators reached civil and criminal settlements with the
company, some for amounts in the tens of millions of dollars.72 None made a
dent in BP upper management’s determination to dominate the global oil
industry.
BP CEO Lord John Browne, a larger than life figure who still retains
great influence in the business world, was determined to transform BP into
the world’s largest oil company.73 Browne and his management team,
nicknamed the “Ninja Turtles,”74 acquired companies like Amoco and
Atlantic Richfield at huge expense and then cut operating costs dramatically
to reduce the large debt on its books.75 In fact, the Texas City refinery was
part of the Amoco purchase.76 BP’s top executives were fully aware that the
plant had been “run to failure” and needed expensive upgrades, but instead
decided to slash its maintenance and renovation costs to the bone.77
Soon, warning signs appeared that better financials existed at the
expense of safe and efficient operations. Hundreds of millions in deferred
maintenance costs were mounting.78 Equipment that was well past its

68
69

Id. at x.

For an excellent explanation of the causes of that disaster, see ANDREW HOPKINS,
FAILURE TO LEARN: THE BP TEXAS CITY REFINERY DISASTER (2008).
70 Sarah Lyall, In BP’s Record, A History of Boldness and Costly Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/energy-environment/13bprisk.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2016).
71 Felicity Barringer, Large Oil Spill in Alaska Went Undetected for Days, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/15/national/15spill.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
72 For a comprehensive listing of BP enforcement actions, with links to original
documentation, see Philip Mattera, BP: Corporate Rap Sheet, CORPORATE RESEARCH PROJECT,
http://www.corp-research.org/BP (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
73 Lyall, supra note 70.
74 Roland Gribben, Turtle Triumph as Young Ninja Takes Over at BP, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 16,
2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2802758/Turtle-triumph-as-young-ninja-takes-over-atBP.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
75 Lyall, supra note 70.
76 BP Global, BP Completes Sale of Texas City Refinery, Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.
bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/bp-completes-sale-of-texas-city-refinery-andrelated-assets-to-marathon-petroleum.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
77 “Run to failure” or “milking the plant” are colloquial terms well known in the business
community to reflect the practice of neglecting maintenance for long periods until an executive
on his way up in an organization migrates to a better job and avoids responsibility for
addressing the steep costs of the practice. See, e.g., ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD
OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 96–97 (2010); WHY NOT JAIL?, supra note 19, at 83.
78 WHY NOT JAIL?, supra note 19, at 100.
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expected life became hazardous.79 Because corporate culture was dollar
wise but risk tolerant, pressure to curtail cost overruns compounded the
lack of maintenance and training, leading directly to the final denouement.

B. Blowout
The Deepwater Horizon movable oil rig was enormous, costing $350
million, weighing in at 33,000 tons, and looming twenty stories above the
sea.80 BP paid the princely sum of $1 million per day to lease the rig,
generating tremendous pressure on midlevel managers to speed up work so
that challenging tasks of drilling Macondo and temporarily closing the well
were completed on time.81 But, as so often happens, they were thwarted by
nature. The Macondo well field posed exceptionally difficult geological
challenges to the point that workers on the rig started referring to it as the
“nightmare well” or “the well from hell.”82
The schedule for completion of the project called for fifty-one days of
drilling at a cost of $96.2 million, but this deadline had slipped by six weeks
with a cost overrun of $58 million as of April 20, 2010, the day of the
blowout.83 That morning, the Transocean crew, in consultation with the
onsite BP company men and a large group of BP engineers based in
Houston, Texas, decided they were ready to finish the temporary
abandonment of the well.84 This operation withdraws the drilling equipment
and seals the well hole with waterproof cement, but leaves the riser pipe
that extends from the surface through the ocean floor to the bottom of the
well in place.85 The Deepwater Horizon would then be towed to its next job.86
Eventually, BP would install a permanent production platform to extract the
oil.87
The Macondo well was drilled to a total depth of 18,360 feet below sea
level, an astounding engineering feat in and of itself.88 At that depth, oil and
gas are contained within the earth under tremendous pressure. To prevent
the “kicks”—or explosive releases—that can occur once drilling reaches
volatile hydrocarbon deposits, crews pour “drilling mud”—a viscous sludge
twice the weight of water—down the pipe.89 Drilling mud is constantly
recirculated in a deepwater well.90 When it reaches the rig, equipment filters

79

For a description of how this strategy manifested itself in the mid-2000s, id. at 99–126.
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 12 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.
81 Id. at 2.
80

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 91–92.
Id. at 91.
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out chunks of rock and other debris displaced by the drilling and the mud is
then pumped back into the pipe.91 The influx and extraction of mud must be
done very carefully because if the pipe is overloaded, it sways, running the
risk that it will crack and require rebuilding.92 If a kick occurs and is large
enough, it displaces the drilling mud and seawater inside the pipes, traveling
at great speed to the surface.93 It erupts within the rig and can catch fire and
explode.94 A massive eruption, known as a blowout, is exactly what
happened on April 20, 2010.95
After an extensive investigation, the National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Spill (Oil Spill Commission) concluded that the crew
aboard the rig, and the engineers that were supporting them in Houston,
Texas, made several critical mistakes in the days leading up to the blowout.96
Readers with a more technical bent can refer to that report for a detailed
description of how those mistakes accumulated, causing the destruction of
the rig. Even more interesting, however, from the perspective of criminal
culpability, is the management system that produced those mistakes,
because it exemplifies both BP’s greed and recklessness as an institution
and the strange way accountability is diffused on board oil rigs and
platforms.
Of course, everyone involved in the decision making offshore and
onshore had a comprehensive understanding of the dangers involved in
drilling an oil well in very deep water, at least at an intellectual level.
Temporarily capping a well is as challenging and requires as much care as
drilling the well in the first place.97 One might suppose that this process
would be controlled by well-trained teams organized in a hierarchical
structure with one experienced and specially trained senior person
responsible for commanding the entire operation. One might also think that
a team of technical experts would travel to the rig during the critical twoweek period when a well was being closed so that the crew that is normally
onboard would have adequate supervision. These suppositions are wrong.
Instead, a kind of Montessori-style free-for-all prevailed, with
employees from five separate companies contributing little pieces to the
larger decision-making process without any single individual keeping track
of how everything fit together.98 No single person had the responsibility and
authority to ensure a safe and effective operation. Engineering decisions
were sporadically referred to BP’s onshore engineering unit in Houston,
often by electronic mail with numerous recipients asked to register any
disagreement with a judgment.99 Because they were not required to go on
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id.
Id.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. at 125.
See id. at 103–04 (describing the temporary abandonment process).
Id. at 122–26.
See, WHY NOT JAIL?, supra note 19, at 171 (citing Andrew Hopkins, DISASTROUS

DECISIONS: THE HUMAN AND ORGANISATIONAL CAUSES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO BLOWOUT (2012)).
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record in support or opposition, some engineers neglected to open the
lengthy attachments that accompanied this disembodied method of
communication and never responded to the messages.100 None of these
people would knowingly risk their own lives, and employees working
onshore—generally white collar professionals—also had ample incentives to
prevent a blowout. But, this ad hoc process was acutely dysfunctional.
BP’s anxiety about costs compounded this very bad dynamic. The Oil
Spill Commission produced a damning chart of nine “Decisions That
Increased Risk At Macondo While Potentially Saving Time.”101 Most were
attributed to BP personnel.102 If one studies the details of BP’s malfeasance
over time—at Texas City, with regard to its multibillion-dollar investment in
Thunder Horse, and on the North Slope—the conviction grows that top
management was fostering the antithesis of a safety culture. Yet as tempting
as it is to dismiss the entire disaster to BP’s aberrant behavior, as its major
competitors have suggested, the Oil Spill Commission disagreed.

C. BP as Rogue
BP’s high wire act came to an abrupt halt when the Macondo well blew
out. The company sold $38 billion in assets to pay for spill cleanup.103 It
signed a criminal settlement resolving multiple counts of federal criminal
violations, paying a stratospheric $4 billion in fines.104 Two top executives
lost their jobs in the wake of the spill: Tony Hayward, the company’s chief
executive officer, and Andy Inglis, his number two, who was in charge of
business development.105 The reasons why they were fired were never
attributed to their tolerance of long-term, reckless operations, but instead
were explained as bad public relations during efforts to contain the spill.106

100 See David Hammer, 5 Key Human Errors, Colossal Mechanical Failure Led to Gulf Oil
Rig Blowout, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 5, 2010, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/

2010/09/5_key_human_errors_colossal_me.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (indicating that BP
engineers failed to see a warning related to cementing that was buried in a report attached to an
email).
101 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra
note 80, at 125.
102
103

Id.

Emily Pickrell, BP’s Pockets are Jingling as Assets Sold, FUEL FIX, Aug. 27, 2012, http://
fuelfix.com/blog/2012/08/27/bp%E2%80%99s-pockets-are-jingling-as-assets-sold/ (last visited Feb.
13, 2016).
104 Steven Mufson, BP Settles Criminal Charges for $4 Billion in Spill; Supervisors Indicted
on Manslaughter, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/bp-to-pay-billions-in-gulf-oil-spill-settlement/2012/11/15/ba0b783a-2f2e-11e2-9f500308e1e75445_story.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
105 Rob Davies, BP Plays Safe as Inglis Pays Price for Spill, THIS IS MONEY, Sept. 29, 2010,
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/article-1316326/BP-plays-safe-Inglis-pays-price-spill.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Brian Walsh, Oil Spill: Goodbye, Mr. Hayward, TIME, July 25, 2010,
http://science.time.com/2010/07/25/oil-spill-goodbye-mr-hayward/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
106 Terry Macalister, BP Boss Tony Hayward Faces Fresh Speculation over Losing Job,
GUARDIAN, June 3, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jun/03/bp-tony-haywardspeculation-job-loss (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
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DOJ also obtained indictments against BP midlevel managers Robert
Kaluza and Donald Vidrine, the well supervisors or “company men” aboard
the Deepwater Horizon, for actions that led to the spill, charging them with
felony counts for each of the eleven men who died and misdemeanor counts
under the Clean Water Act.107 In December 2015, the manslaughter charges
were dropped.108 Vidrine settled with DOJ, but Kaluza is on his way to trial.
No one higher up the chain of responsibility has been indicted. We will never
know whether upper-level managers were even investigated, but DOJ’s
hesitance to enforce the responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is
very disappointing.
BP was forced to abandon the dream of becoming the world’s largest
oil company although it is beginning to return to normal operation
presumably with far stricter safety protocols.109 Even if it manages to avoid
another destructive incident, the question is whether the high price of BP’s
malfeasance is sufficient to deter other giants in the oil industry. BP’s
competitors have engaged in a blatantly self-serving campaign to persuade
the public that BP is a rogue, in an effort to discourage more stringent
regulation of the other oil industry players, and that narrative is as
comforting as it is illusory.110
The Oil Spill Commission firmly rejected the rogue hypothesis:
The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of
identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such
systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety
111
culture of the entire industry.

Congress did not respond to this finding by passing a new law that would
strengthen the regulatory regime that governs such high hazard operations.
Nor did it markedly increase the budget of the agency responsible for
inspecting such facilities, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE), which is located within the Department of Interior. In
107 Andy Grimm, BP Oil Spill: Criminal Cases Largely Unresolved 5 Years After Deepwater
Horizon Blowout, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 17, 2015, http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/

2015/04/bp_oil_spill_criminal_cases_la.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
108 Michael Kunzelman, Judge Rules Out Mentions of Deaths at BP Supervisor’s Trial, THE
BIG STORY, Feb. 4, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0214ae2d16d04443897a05903ed95ac1/judge
-rules-out-mentions-deaths-bp-supervisors-trial (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
109 Stanley Reed, At BP, There’s Optimism in the Corner Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/business/energy-environment/bp-still-struggling-to-put-gulfspill-behind-it.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
110 John M. Broder, Oil Executives Break Ranks and Criticize BP at Congressional Hearing,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A20 (“The chairmen of four of the world’s largest oil companies
broke their nearly two-month silence on the major spill in the Gulf of Mexico on Tuesday and
publicly blamed BP for mishandling the well that caused the disaster. Seeking to insulate their
companies from the continuing crisis in the gulf and the political backlash in Washington, the
leaders of Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Shell and ConocoPhillips insisted at a Congressional hearing
that they would not have made the mistakes that led to the well explosion and the deaths of 11
rig workers on April 20.”).
111 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra
note 80, at vii.
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fiscal year 2014, BSEE had 818 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees who
were responsible for overseeing deepwater exploration and production in
the Outer Continental Shelf, which includes the Gulf of Mexico, California,
and Alaska, including about 3,000 platforms and rigs.112 Offshore wells
account for seventeen percent of U.S. crude oil production.113
The failure to dramatically increase oversight of deep well production
in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe is made more troubling
by the continuous extension of risk. For example, a $3 billion Royal Dutch
Shell platform called the Perdido, a Spanish word meaning lost, operates 200
miles offshore in water 8,000 feet deep.114 As Edward Chow, a former
industry executive who is now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies told the New York Times: “Our ability to manage risks
hasn’t caught up with our ability to explore and produce in deep water. . . .
The question now is, how are we going to protect against a blowout as well
as all of the other associated risks offshore?”115
IV. VW’S MANIACAL CHEAT
If BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster is emblematic of what happens in a
high-hazard industry when self-regulation prevails, the emerging VW scandal
demonstrates how a company with overweening confidence in its
technological prowess and no apparent fear of discovery can pull off what
can only be described as a regulatory heist. This hubris had what looks in
retrospect like an amazing run: seven years of escaping detection in a system
with routine testing and relatively strong enforcement.

A. Eleven Million Cars, Sixty Premature Deaths, Thirty-Five Percent of Share
Value, and Counting
VW’s marketing strategy in the United States was to promote the image
that it is an iconoclast.116 In the land of lumbering SUVs and stodgy minivans,
112 See BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET
JUSTIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FISCAL YEAR 2015 3 (2015), available at
http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/About_BSEE/Budget/00000%20BSEE%20FY%202015%
20Final%20Greenbook%20File.pdf (listing number of FTE employees for FY 2014); see also
Bureau of Safety & Envtl. Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Oil and Gas Production Safety Systems
Proposed Rule, http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/BSEE-Fact-Sheet/Fact-Sheet-for-SafetySystems-Proposed-Rule/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting the number of platforms and rigs on
the Outer Continental Shelf).
113 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Gulf of Mexico Fact Sheet, July 2, 2015, http://www.eia.
gov/special/gulf_of_mexico/data.cfm#petroleum_fuel_facts (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
114 Jad Mouawad & Barry Meier, Risk-Taking Rises to New Levels as Oil Rigs in Gulf Drill
Deeper, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/business/energyenvironment/30deep.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
115
116

Id.
See Dale Buss, Volkswagen Grows Up with New “Why VW” Marketing Campaign,

FORBES, Sept. 18, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/dalebuss/2012/09/18/volkswagen-grows-upwith-new-why-vw-marketing-campaign/#4b3e705231d5 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (discussing
VW’s marketing campaign before the defeat devices were discovered, which was meant to
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it sold frisky, little, fuel-efficient, diesel cars named the Rabbit and the
Beetle for people who are as proud of their social consciousness as they are
thrifty.117 The image grew via a series of tongue-in-cheek, deliberately
humorous advertisements. For example, a television advertisement shown
during the 2014 Super Bowl shows a jovial dad and his sulky teenage
daughter riding along in their VW just as the odometer changes to 100,000.118
The father tells the child that this milestone is very significant and asks what
she would say if he told her that every time a VW car hits it, a German
engineer “gets his wings.”119 A chirpy, little, polka-like tune starts to play and
a series of men in white coats wearing safety glasses and hard hats suddenly
sprout very large sets of white, feathered angel’s wings with appropriate
parachute-opening sound effects.120
Had the brand been less self-consciously righteous, EPA’s public
announcement at the end of September 2015 that VW had installed software
that turned off “air emission control devices” (AECD) in 500,000 cars driven
in America might have inspired somewhat less outrage.121 Yet given such
strong branding, people felt betrayed as well as cheated. In Europe, matters
went from bad to worse when the company acknowledged that 10.5 million
cars were affected worldwide, most of them on that continent.122 Six weeks
later, another large shoe dropped when the company admitted to
underestimating emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), a cause of climate
change, and overstating fuel economy for 800,000 European vehicles.123 EPA
also announced that it had discovered a second suspect software program
on 2016 models, although VW denied that the program violated the law.124
The U.S. DOJ immediately launched a criminal investigation.125
Authorities in thirty states opened their own inquiries and the plaintiffs’ bar
filed lawsuits for consumer damages across the country.126 German
“encourage ‘storytelling’ about the VW brand, ‘values’ and vehicles, and to spark social-media
conversation”).
117 For example, characteristics of the Beetle including its technical features, size, and
shape set it apart from American vehicles. See BERNHARD RIEGER, THE PEOPLE’S CAR: A GLOBAL
HISTORY OF THE VOLKSWAGEN BEETLE 199, 204–05 (2013) (“The Volkswagen’s success was
connected to a nascent, middle-class consumer reform movement that began to articulate itself
in the mid-fifties and castigated conspicuous consumption as wasteful.”).
118 See Motoren & Mehr, TV-Spot: WingsVolkswagen Game Day CommercialSuper Bowl
2014, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S8x7NFYHtm8 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
119 Id.
120
121

Id.

Davenport & Ewing, supra note 1.
Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Says 11 Million Cars Worldwide Are Affected in Diesel
Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/
international/volkswagen-diesel-car-scandal.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
123 Jack Ewing & Graham Bowley, VW Reveals It Misstated Emissions of Gas Cars, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2015, at B1.
124 Mike Spector & William Boston, VW, EPA Spar Over Tests, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2015, at
A1.
125 Aruna Viswanatha & Mike Spector, U.S. Widens Net for VW, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2015, at
B2.
126 Danielle Ivory, Volkswagen Is Targeted in Inquiry by 30 States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2015, at
B2.
122
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authorities began their own inquiry, while in Paris prosecutors raided the
company’s offices and seized computers.127 VW hired an American law firm,
Jones Day, to carry out an internal investigation.128 Its chief executive officer,
Martin Winterkorn, resigned a few days after the first scandal broke, and
was replaced by Matthias Müller, who came from Porsche, another VW
brand.129
VW employs 593,000 workers worldwide, and by some accounts is the
backbone of the German economy.130 The company’s share value fell by
thirty-five percent within a few days of the announcement.131 The diesel
scandal may cost the company $7.5 billion and the CO2 and fuel efficiency
scandal another $2.2 billion.132 Its mother country was thrown into something
approaching panic, much as Britain had been in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon explosion.133
At this early stage, details about which VW executives knew what and
when are not yet clear, although the company appeared to be working hard
to throw various senior engineers under the proverbial bus to deflect closer
scrutiny of its marketing, financial, and sales executives.134 Without a doubt,
skilled software engineers were summoned to the rescue when someone
senior at the company discovered in 2008 that the diesel models the
company was counting on to take the American market by storm had AECDs
that would not allow the cars to pass U.S. tests.135
“The ‘cheat device’ the engineers designed for diesel cars accomplished
the feat of informing onboard emissions control technology when the cars
were subjected to an evaluation of its effectiveness at the independent
127 Nick Kostov & Jason Chow, Police Raid Volkswagen Headquarters in France, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/police-raid-volkswagens-headquarters-in-france1445166198 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
128 Ewing & Bowley, supra note 123; Jones Day, http://www.jonesday.com/home.aspx (last
visited Feb. 13, 2016) (Jones Day is among the world’s largest law firms, with 2,400 lawyers in
offices throughout the world.).
129 Jack Ewing, Rigged Testing by Volkswagen Fells Its C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, at
A1, B11.
130 Id.; Richard Milne, Volkswagen: System Failure, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2015, http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/0/47f233f0-816b-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767.html#axzz3rOUsBjp2 (last visited Feb. 13,
2016).
131 Tony Czuczka & Arne Delfs, Volkswagen Too Big to Fail for Germany’s Political Classes,
BLOOMBERG BUS., Oct. 1, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-01/volkswagen
-too-big-to-fail-for-germany-s-political-classes (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
132 Ewing & Bowley, supra note 123.
133 See Ruth Bender, German Minister Heads to U.S. for Talks on Volkswagen Scandal, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 23, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-minister-heads-to-washington-fortalks-on-volkswagen-scandal-1445614488 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting Berlin’s concerns
about the implications of the cheating scandal for the German economy).
134 Mike Spector & Amy Harder, Volkswagen U.S. CEO Says He Didn’t Know in 2014 of
Emissions Defeat Devices, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-us-ceo-says-he-didnt-know-in-2014-of-emissions-defeat-devices-1444316371 (last visited Feb. 13,
2016).
135 William Boston, VW Probe Targets Engineers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2015, at A1, A10; Jack
Ewing, Volkswagen Engine-Rigging Scheme Said to Have Begun in 2008, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/engine-shortfall-pushed-volkswagen-toevade-emissions-testing.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
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testing facilities that periodically certify compliance.”136 The rest of the time
or, in other words, during every hour of their routine operation, the software
turned the AECDs off.137 As it turns out, “[a] vehicle’s onboard computer can
operate in two modes, ‘on road’ and ‘dyno,’” with the second triggered only
when the emissions are being tested.138 The chief reason why the defeat
device was necessary on VW cars was that the company wanted to keep
them light and small, and rejected more sophisticated emissions control
systems used in heavier vehicles.139
The existence of the cheat device was discovered almost by accident,
when researchers at West Virginia University were testing fuel efficiency as
cars were driven on-road.140 The study was commissioned by a tiny
environmental group trying to document that European air quality standards
were more lax than those in the United States.141 Two VW cars happened to
end up in the initial mix of models subject to the first tests and the
researchers were startled to discover that the cars gave off pollution
significantly in excess of the stationary testing standard.142 The researchers
took their findings to EPA and the California Air Resources Board (CARB).143
Pinning down the exact nature and location of the cheat devices took
considerably more time, and eventually VW was informed of the problem.144
It stonewalled the two regulatory agencies that spearheaded the
investigation: EPA, of course, and CARB.145 Finally, likely irritated by the
company’s arrogant attitude, EPA announced its probe and the news
traveled rapidly around the world.146
In a sense, the fact that regulators got a tip on the problem from
independent researchers was a lucky break that does not reflect well on
their ability to prevent such violations. The discovery would be more

136 RENA STEINZOR, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: SIX
CASE STUDIES DRAWN FROM ONGOING PROSECUTIONS TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER AND
CONSUMER SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 25 (Nov. 2015).
137 Andrea Peterson & Brian Fung, The Tech Behind How Volkswagen Tricked Emissions
Tests, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2015/09/22/the-tech-behind-how-volkswagen-tricked-emissions-tests/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
138 Robert Duffer, Volkswagen Diesel Scandal: What You Need to Know, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22,
2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/automotive/ct-volkswagen-diesel-scandal-faq20150921-story.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
139 Umair Irfan, Why Volkswagen Declared Defeat in Diesel Cars, SCI. AM., Oct. 9, 2015,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-volkswagen-declared-defeat-in-diesel-cars/ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2016).
140 Sonari Glinton, How a Little Lab in West Virginia Caught Volkswagen’s Big Cheat, NPR,
Sept. 24, 2015, http://www.npr.org/2015/09/24/443053672/how-a-little-lab-in-west-virginia-caughtvolkswagens-big-cheat (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
141 David Shepardson, How VW Got Caught Cheating Emissions Tests, DETROIT NEWS, Sept.
29, 2015, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/foreign/2015/09/24/vw-caught/727
15074/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
142
143
144

Id.
Id.
Id.

145 Bill Vlasic & Aaron M. Kessler, It Took E.P.A. Pressure to Get VW to Admit Fault, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015, at A1, B8.
146

See id.

10_TOJCI.STEINZOR (DO NOT DELETE)

3/29/2016 3:31 PM

230

[Vol. 46:209

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

reassuring had the regulators discovered the problem on their own. After all,
the cheat device was in effect for seven years before the company admitted
it existed, spewing pollution anywhere from ten to forty times national
standards.147
Although the media has focused disproportionately on the economic
implications of VW’s malfeasance, the results of the excess pollution
sickened people and even triggered premature deaths.148 The pollutant at
stake in the controversy was nitrous oxide (NOx), a precursor gas that
combines with volatile organic compounds to produce ozone or, as it is
more commonly known, smog.149 Excess ozone is primarily a problem in the
nation’s major metropolitan areas.150 It is such a serious problem that EPA
recently lowered the levels allowed in the ambient air significantly.151
The adverse health effects caused by excessive smog are devastating,
especially to the very young, the elderly, or anyone else with compromised
respiratory systems.152 A study conducted in 2013 by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology’s Laboratory for Aviation and the Environment
found that 200,000 early deaths are caused by ground-level pollution, with
emissions from road transportation the most significant cause.153 The study
further found that vehicle exhaust was a factor in 53,000 deaths.154
In October 2015, a study by scientists at MIT and Harvard University
concluded that VW’s cheat device, which resulted in pollution ten to forty
times higher than applicable EPA standards, could result in as many as fiftynine deaths in the United States and impose “social costs” (e.g., illness, days
off work and school) up to $450 million.155

147 Benjamin Hulac, Volkswagen Uses Software to Fool EPA Pollution Tests, SCI. AM., Sept.
21,
2015,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/volkswagen-uses-software-to-fool-epapollution-tests/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
148 See Matthew Freeman, The Media Is Missing the Most Important Part of the VW Scandal,
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=02473AAB-E967-042C-660887E119
56B225 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (stating that hundreds have died as a result of VW’s
willingness to pollute the air and then lie about it).
149 For a general background on this kind of pollution and the adverse health effects it
causes, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SMOG: WHO DOES IT HURT? WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT OZONE AND YOUR HEALTH (1999), available at http://www3.epa.gov/airnow/health/
smog.pdf.
150 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Ground-Level Ozone: Basic Information, http://www3.epa.
gov/ozonepollution/basic.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
151 Coral Davenport, New Limit for Smog-Causing Emissions Isn’t as Strict as Many Had
Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/politics/epa-to-unveilnew-limit-for-smog-causing-ozone-emissions.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
152 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Ground-Level Ozone: Health Effects, http://www3.epa.gov/
ozonepollution/health.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
153 Fabio Caiazzo et al., Air Pollution and Early Deaths in the United States. Part I:
Quantifying the Impact of Major Sectors in 2005, 79 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 198, 204 (2013).
154

Id.

155

Steven R.H. Barrett et al., Impact of the Volkswagen Emissions Control Defeat Device on
US Public Health, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 114005, Oct. 19, 2015, at 1, 2, available at
http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/10/11/114005.
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B. An Eerie Reprise of the Deepwater Horizon
Although VW’s scheme did not result in a fireball that killed eleven and
soaked one of the world’s most fragile ecosystems in oil, the central causes
of that quieter fiasco bear a disconcerting resemblance to the arrogance that
led to BP’s fall. Figure 1, below, compares those characteristics.156 The chart
confirms the conclusion of the previous Section: management problems and
lack of oversight by government regulators played the central role in the
crises now confronting each company. Both companies were headed by
larger-than-life CEOs, who were driving to become the largest company in
their industrial sector, exhibiting the kind of pride that often comes before a
fall.157
On November 9, 2015, the international rating service Fitch-Ratings
(Fitch) downgraded VW’s Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to BBB+
from A.158 “The downgrade reflects the corporate governance, management
and internal control issues highlighted by the ongoing emissions test crisis
related to up to 11 million diesel-powered vehicles,” Fitch declared in its
press release.159 It added that the company’s corporate governance was
“weaker than that of its main peers” because it had a “blocking minority” of
only twenty percent [on its supervisory board] with respect to “voting
resolutions,” as well as “potential conflicts of interest on the part of some
board members, and lack of independence and diversity at the supervisory
board level.”160 Fitch added that VW had been slow to make changes
regarding its two boards: one labeled as “management” and a second, with
superior status, labeled “supervisory.”161 Although it commended VW’s
voluntary disclosure that it had underestimated CO2 emissions, it said that
this problem suggested that further bad news was likely to emerge,
comprising “reputational damage” to the company that could undermine its
“funding ability.”162 The overall outlook for potential investors was
negative.163
VW is controlled by four stakeholders: 1) senior management; 2) private
investors; 3) representatives of its very powerful union, IG Metall; and 4) the
governments of Lower Saxony and Qatar, which, along with original
investors from the families that helped found the company, hold a large
portion of its shares.164 The company’s executive ranks have been dominated

156

See infra fig.1.

157

VW became the largest automaker in the world when its sales surpassed Toyota’s in
2014. Jad Mouawad, Volkswagen’s Scandal Further Strains Its Relationship with Its U.S.
Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015, at B2. For further information about Lord Browne’s dream, see
LUSTGARTEN, supra note 66, at 7.
158 Fitch, Fitch Downgrades Volkswagen to “BBB+”; Outlook Negative, https://www.
fitchratings.com/site/fitch-home/pressrelease?id=993669 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Milne, supra note 130 (explaining the hierarchy of VW’s boards).
Fitch, supra note 158.
Id.
Milne, supra note 130.
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by the descendants of the families that helped build the company, some
going back to its creation by Adolf Hitler in 1936.165 The British subsequently
reorganized the company, and it played a crucial role in Germany’s postwar
Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle).166 Exacerbating these incestuous
relationships, the company is supervised by two boards of directors, one
that advises management and one that is supposed to be a watchdog for the
company as a whole.167 The vast majority of the members of these boards are
insiders who have close ties to existing interest groups, their ability to
change the course of the company is weak, and this structure clearly
bothered Fitch evaluators.168
The other source of VW’s managerial weakness, critics charge, is its
close ties to organized labor, which mean that job losses have been
“taboo.”169 The result has been that VW is bloated (with 593,000 workers)
compared to its strongest rival, Toyota (with just 344,000); both companies
make roughly the same number of cars and until the scandal emerged, VW
had inched Toyota out of the top spot as largest automaker in the world.170
“People are starting to question the whole VW system again . . . VW is
among the most complicated and questionably governed companies,” Hans
Hirt, a director at Hermes Equity Ownership Services, told the Financial
Times.171 “In other cases, you have strong families. But here you also have
state ownership and powerful employees. It is a very special mix.”172 Hermes
is an activist investor based in Britain.173
When the defeat device scandal emerged, VW’s top executives took
quick defensive action: they blamed the company’s engineers. Michael Horn,
head of the VW Group of America, told Congress that “a couple of software
engineers” had invented the cheat device.174 “To my understanding this was
not a corporate decision,” he added.175 “This was something individuals
did.”176 Until the investigations are finished, this version of reality is difficult
to dispute, although it is both self-serving and implausible. At a company the
size of VW, with the usual second-guessing at the mid-management level,
could two isolated technocrats decide to take such a huge risk—engineering
a piece of software that deliberately violates American and European law?

165 Id.; Dietmar Hawranek, The Porsche Story: A Fierce Family Feud, SPIEGEL ONLINE, July
21, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/the-porsche-story-a-fierce-family-feud-a637243-druck.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
166 Milne, supra note 130.
167

Id.

168

Fitch, supra note 158.
Milne, supra note 130 (“Together with the presence of lower Saxony on the board, it
meant job losses—particularly at VW’s notoriously inefficient main factory next to its
headquarters in Wolfsburg—were all but taboo.”).
170 Id.; Mouawad, supra note 157.
171 Milne, supra note 130.
172 Id.
169

173

Id.

174

Spector & Harder, supra note 134.

175

Id.
Id.

176
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The suspicion that the conspiracy extended further is confirmed by an
excellent piece of reporting in the Wall Street Journal. VW’s determination to
push “clean diesel” began a decade ago, under then-CEO Bernd
Pischetsrieder, who lured executive Wolfgang Bernhard from rival company
Daimler AG and made him the head of the VW brand.177 Bernhard was also in
charge of designing a new diesel engine, dubbed EA-189.178 He decided to
license a superior emissions control system from his old company.179 Called
“BlueTec,” the system used urea to scrub emissions and was relatively large
and heavy compared to VW’s homegrown system.180 Its further disadvantage
was that the consumer had to refill the urea tank periodically.181 As the
engine design progressed, a corporate putsch resulted in the expulsion of
Pischetsrieder, and Bernhard left soon after.182 The BlueTec license was
cancelled, and VW reverted to its own, less effective system.183 Several
people were involved in that decision, and it is difficult to imagine that when
the VW pollution control equipment failed to satisfy the American standard
for NOx, its replacement by computer software was undertaken by a couple
of engineers in a stealth mission.
In the end, VW could be charged with any one of a number of crimes,
including wire fraud (for selling cars that did not remotely justify the claims
in its many advertisements) and making false statements to the government
officials. Ironically, the one criminal charge the company and its executives
are likely to escape is violating the Clean Air Act’s requirement that all cars
used in the United States have operational and effective AECDs approved by
the government.184 John Dingell—the longest-serving member of the House
of Representatives and a staunch ally of the auto industry—made sure
automakers were exempt, arguing, disingenuously, that civil penalties are
“easier, speedier, quicker.”185 Fortunately, Senator Richard Blumenthal (DConn.), who is still in Congress and is a former attorney general of the state
of Connecticut with an excellent record of prosecuting cases to protect
consumers and the environment, has stated that “[t]he loophole should be
closed.”186

177

Boston, supra note 135, at A10.
Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.; Irfan, supra note 139 (indicating that diesel engines are traditionally heavier, and that
VW sought to create a system that delivered both “fuel economy and power” through
turbocharged direct injection (emphasis in original)); Green Car Reports, Adding Urea to Clean
Diesel Cars: Can I Just Pee in the Tank?, BUS. INSIDER, May 24, 2011, http://businessinsider.
178

com/adding-urea-to-clean-diesel-cars-can-i-just-pee-in-the-tank-2011-5 (last visited Feb. 13,
2016).
181 Green Car Reports, supra note 180.
182 Boston, supra note 135, at A10.
183 Id.
184 Amy Harder & Aruna Viswanatha, Volkswagen May Not Face Environmental Criminal
Charges, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-may-not-faceenvironmental-criminal-charges-1443567204 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
185
186

Id.
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

Legal historian Lawrence Friedman identifies three goals of the criminal
law: deterrence, punishment, and the setting of “moral boundaries” to show
a society “where the line lies between good and bad.”187 The third goal is too
often overlooked. Its application to renegade companies and their wellcompensated executives has become extraordinarily important to the quality
of life in the developed and developing worlds.
But white collar criminal prosecutions are not only important because
of the immediate effects they can achieve in correcting behavior that harms
public health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment. They are
also vital to combat the more insidious reality that American justice is no
longer blind.
The nation’s 5,000 prisons held about 2.2 million inmates and an
additional 4.7 million people were on probation or parole in 2013.188 Per
capita, the United States imprisons 716 out of 100,000 people, more than any
other nation, including Russia and China.189 African American men are six
times more likely to be incarcerated than white men.190 Despite constituting
only thirteen percent of the U.S. population, forty percent of the prison
population is African American.191 Latinos represent sixteen percent of the
overall population but nineteen percent of the prison population.192 Whites
are sixty-four percent of the overall population but only thirty-nine percent
of those incarcerated.193
Some might imagine that escalating violent crime rates justify a myopic
focus on street crime. But the factor that has played the largest role in the
rapid growth of prisons and prison populations is the relentless pursuit of
minor drug offenses. Over the decade beginning in 2001, eight million people
were arrested for marijuana; simple possession charges accounted for
eighty-eight percent of this total, and marijuana was the target of fifty-two

187

FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 10.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, 2 (2014),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf (providing 2013 data regarding
prison populations); Christopher Ingraham, The U.S. Has More Jails Than Colleges. Here’s a
Map of Where Those Prisoners Live, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/06/the-u-s-has-more-jails-than-colleges-heres-a-map-of-wherethose-prisoners-live/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (indicating that the United States has slightly
over 5,000 prisons).
189 ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (2013).
190 Bruce Drake, Incarceration Gap Widens Between Whites and Blacks, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., Sept. 6, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/06/incarceration-gap-between
-whites-and-blacks-widens/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
191 Jamal Hagler, 8 Facts You Should Know About the Criminal Justice System and People of
Color,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2015/05/28/113436/8-facts-youshould-know-about-the-criminal-justice-system-and-people-of-color/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
188

192
193

Id.
Id.
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percent of all drug arrests.194 African Americans were 3.73 times more likely
to be arrested than whites.195
At the same time, no individual was prosecuted for contributing to the
2008 recession even as the phenomenon of what has come to be known as
“mass incarceration” continues to spiral.196 The corrosive notion that some
financial institutions are “too big to fail”197 quickly morphed into the idea that
corporations in general may be “too big to jail,”198 further discrediting the
system. Despite the spike in prosecutions for egregious health and safety
violations I listed at the outset of this Essay, the most common outcome
remains payment by corporations of huge fines, dwarfed only by their net
revenues.
The clear message of this divided system is that scales of justice, a
cornerstone of American democracy, have all but abandoned any effort to
treat rich and poor, white or people of color, the same. As important as clean
air and water are to all of us, we risk the values that make them possible if
these profound inequities are not addressed.

194

AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 4, 14 (2013),

available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/090613-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf.
195 Id. at 17.
196 Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mass Incarceration, https://www.aclu.org/issues/massincarceration (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
197 ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 539 (2009).
198 BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS, 1–2 (2014).
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Figure 1: The Parallel Odysseys of BP and VW
Causal Factors
BP
VW
Texas City refinery
Cheat devices are wellRecidivism:
disaster that killed
known in the auto
Both companies had
fifteen; spill on the North industry. Ironically, in
scoffed at the law
Slope of Alaska.199 In the
1973, just three years
before, without
after EPA was created,
meaningful legal
case of the Texas City
regulators discovered
repercussions, and
refinery, Occupational
that VW had installed
executives seemed to Safety and Health
cheat devices on its cars
have developed a
Administration (OSHA)
and EPA imposed a civil
mindset that
regulators agreed to a
penalty of $120,000.202
whatever civil
settlement that required
consequences
the company to fix all
From 1991–1995, GM
regulators dished out, outstanding problems,
used a cheat device to
executives could
but when OSHA returned defeat controls on
manage as a cost of
four years later, they
carbon monoxide; in
doing business.
discovered that these
1998, Ford installed
requirements were
such devices on its
ignored.200 They issued a
Econoline vans; in 1998,
diesel truck owners and
second consent order
imposing $50.6 million in operators paid $1 billion
in civil penalties for
penalties.201
installing cheat devices
to defeat pollution
control systems so that
long-haul truckers could
complete long journeys
faster.203

199 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor OSHA Issues Record-Breaking
Fines to BP (Oct. 30, 2009), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_
table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=16674 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
200
201

Id.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, BP to Pay $50.6 Million to Resolve U.S. Labor Dep’t
Litigation (Aug. 12, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_
table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=18156 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
202 Jeff Plungis, Carmaker Cheating on Emissions Almost as Old as Pollution Tests,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 23, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-23/carmakercheating-on-emissions-almost-as-old-as-pollution-tests (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
203 Warren Brown & Pierre Thomas, Emissions Case Costs GM Fine, Cadillac Recall, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/12/01/emissions-casecosts-gm-fine-cadillac-recall/ba27a350-1b90-4574-a8c7-2a0ad5312e76/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016)
(explaining General Motor’s settlement over cheat devices); Joby Warrick, EPA: Volkswagen
Used “Defeat Device” to Illegally Skirt Air-Pollution Controls, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/09/18/epa-volkswagenused-defeat-device-to-circumvent-air-pollution-controls/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (referring to
Ford as an example of automaker’s long history of using cheat devices); Naftali Bendavid,
Penalty for Truck Pollution: $1 Billion, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1998, http://articles.chicagotribune.
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Causal Factors
Driving to Become
Number One: Both
companies were led
by strong, autocratic
leaders—BP CEO
Lord John Browne
and VW CEO Martin
Winkterkorn.204 They
brooked no
opposition in their
relentless drive to
become the world’s
largest oil company
or automaker.
Ultimately they were
successful, but
success was shortlived. Both men’s
strategies involved
rampant cost-cutting.

BP
Under the leadership of
Browne, BP acquired
competitors (Amoco and
Atlantic Richfield), was
quite aggressive in the
drive to lease property
where oil might be
discovered, and as a
result amassed
significant debt.205 To
improve the appearance
of the company’s
balance sheets, top
executive team engaged
in relentless cost-cutting
and deferred
maintenance.206 The
pressure to cut costs
was a major factor in the
Macondo Well blowout
because temporary
abandonment of the well
was weeks overdue and
BP was leasing the
Deepwater Horizon rig
for $1 million/day.207
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VW
VW CEO
Winkterkorn was
determined to penetrate
the American market
for diesel cars.208 The
company had two
problems: consumers
had little experience
with diesels and
American pollution laws
were significantly more
stringent than those in
Europe.209 Having
decided to reject a more
expensive and bulkier
pollution control device,
VW engineers were
under tremendous
pressure to develop the
cheat in 2007, right
before the American
diesels rolled off the
line.210

com/1998-10-23/news/9810230110_1_detroit-diesel-corp-engines-mack-trucks (last visited Feb.
13, 2016) (explaining diesel-engine makers’ settlement over cheat devices).
204 Gribben, supra note 74 (describing a memo from Tony Hayward to BP management that
finds the leadership “doesn’t listen hard enough to what the bottom of the organisation is
saying”); Volkswagen Executives Describe Authoritarian Culture Under Former CEO,
GUARDIAN, Oct. 10, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/10/volkswagenexecutives-martin-winterkorn-company-culture (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting that five
former executives from VW confirmed Winterkorn’s management style “fostered a climate of
fear, an authoritarianism that went unchecked partly due to a company structure unique in the
German motor industry”).
205 WHY NOT JAIL?, supra note 19, at 99–100.
206 Id. at 107, 108 (noting that “[i]ndependent reports emphasized the impact of relentless
cost-cutting directives,” and previous accidents are “attributable to a culture that allowed
crucial components of the physical plant to ‘run to failure’”).
207 Id. at 150.
208 See supra text accompanying note 179.
209 Boston, supra note 135 (describing American consumers as skeptical of diesel
technology and American efforts to tighten emissions standards for diesel engines).
210 Ewing, supra note 135 (explaining that rather than stopping production of its diesel
engines and throwing out years of work and investment, VW devised a cheat in 2008 as it began
a push to market clean diesel technology).
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Causal Factors
Brutal internal
culture: Even the
most acute crisis did
not deflect the drive
to become number
one.

BP
When a new site
director, Don Parus,
arrived at the Texas
City refinery, he
concluded that the
facility had $235 million
in deferred repairs that
were causing many
accidents and even
resulting in unnecessary
worker deaths. Parus
even took the drastic
step of presenting a
PowerPoint containing
photographs of workers
killed in plant accidents
to John Manzoni, the BP
Chief Executive for
refining, and Michael
Hoffman, group vice
president for U.S.
refining.211 Manzoni and
Hoffman did not yield.
A few months later, an
explosion at the
refinery killed 15
people.212

VW
VW has been enmeshed
in various scandals and
internal power struggles.
Winterkorn, who took
over as CEO in 2007,
fought successfully to
marginalize opponents
and kept an iron grip on
the internal operations
of the company.213 VW
engineers developed a
diesel engine they
claimed would meet
American standards,
along the way rejecting a
more expensive
pollution control
technology that would
have made better
reductions.214 When they
discovered in 2007 that
the engine would not
meet American
standards, the engineers
invented the cheat
device software.215

211 Frontline, BP’s Troubled Past, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-spill/bptroubled-past/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); Ryan Knutson, Blast at BP Texas Refinery in ‘05
Foreshadowed Gulf Disaster, PROPUBLICA, July 2, 2010, http://www.propublica.org/article/blastat-bp-texas-refinery-in-05-foreshadowed-gulf-disaster (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
212 Frontline, supra note 211.
213 Andreas Cremer & Tom Bergin, Fear and Respect: VW’s Culture Under Winterkorn,
REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/10/us-volkswagen-emissionsculture-idUSKCN0S40MT20151010 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
214 Dune Lawrence et al, How Could Volkswagen’s Top Engineers Not Have Known?,
BLOOMBERG BUS., Oct. 21, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/how-couldvolkswagen-s-top-engineers-not-have-known- (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
215

Id.
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Causal Factors
Foreign Relations
Implications: BP
stock part of the
portfolio of many
pension funds in
England.216 VW
employs close to
600,000 workers
worldwide, including
one in seven German
auto workers.217 Auto
industry central to
health of German
economy.218
Recalcitrance during
Crisis: Neither
company cooperated
with regulators after
the crises erupted
until they were forced
to get in line.
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BP
British government
lobbied White House
successfully to drop
debarment of BP from
federal government
contracts in wake of
Deepwater Horizon
disaster.219

VW
VW executives already
warning that cheat
device scandal is an
“existence-threatening
crisis for company.”220
Angela Merkel has
remained at arm’s length
but may not be able to
stay on sidelines once
government and private
plaintiff cases start
moving through the
pipeline.221

BP fudged and withheld
how much oil was
gushing out of the
blown out pipe for
many weeks.222 One
manager was
prosecuted for lying to
the government about
these figures.223

VW stalled EPA for one
year, refusing to admit it
had installed a cheat
device and insisting that
EPA and independent
emissions testing was
wrong.224

216 John Greenwood, Has the BP Oil Spill Tarred Your Pension Fund?, TELEGRAPH, July 2,
2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/7868142/Has-the-BP-oil-spill
-tarred-your-pension-fund.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
217 Czuczka & Delfs, supra note 131.
218 Milne, supra note 130.
219 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA to Lift Suspension and Debarment of BP
from Federal Government Contracts/Agreement Contains Strong Provisions to Continue Safety
and Ethics Improvements in Order to Comply (Mar. 13, 2014), http://yosemite.epa.gov
/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/c6a5be4a1a2db87f85257c9a0071760c
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
220 Jan Schwartz & Andreas Cremer, Volkswagen Chairman: The Emissions Scandal is “an
Existence-Threatening Crisis”, BUS. INSIDER, Oct. 3, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/
volkswagens-emissions-scandal-is-an-existence-threatening-crisis-2015-10.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2016).
221 See Eanna Kelly, Volkswagen Scandal Sparking a Charge into Electric Cars, SCI. BUS.,
Nov. 5, 2015, http://www.sciencebusiness.net/news/77302/Volkswagen-scandal-sparking-acharge-into-electric-cars.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting that the strategy of Germany
thus far has been to keep Volkswagen at arm’s length).
222 See Justin Gillis, Scientists Fault Lack of Studies over Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/science/earth/20noaa.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016)
(discussing BP’s refusal to allow scientists to send equipment to the ocean floor to measure the
rate of oil spillage).
223 Ex-BP Executive Found Not Guilty of Lying to Investigators During 2010 Gulf Oil Spill,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/business/ex-bp-executive-foundnot-guilty-of-lying-to-investigators-during-2010-gulf-oil-spill.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
224 Vlasic & Kessler, supra note 145.

